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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : CaseNo.20020527-CA 
JARED CASANOVA, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for one count of aggravated 
robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999); one 
count of attempted theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
404 (1999); failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5 (Supp. 2001); and attempted escape, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309 (1999), in the Third Judicial 
District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable Robin W. Reese, Judge, presiding. 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 
(1996). See Addendum A (Judgment and Conviction). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in violation of Casanova's right to equal 
protection when it allowed the State to exercise a racially-motivated peremptory strike 
against the only Hispanic juror where the prosecutor's explanation was not supported by 
the facts in the record and where the trial court failed to make adequate findings in 
support of its determination? 
Standard of Review: "A trial court's determination that the opponent of a 
peremptory challenge has failed to prove purposeful racial discrimination 'generally turns 
on the credibility of the proponent of the strike[.]' State v. ColwelL 2000 UT 8, ^ [20, 994 
P.2d 177. 'As this is a question of fact, we will not reverse the decision of the trial court 
unless it is clearly erroneous.1 State v. Bowman. 945 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah App. 1997). 
However, '[i]f the trial court fails to make adequate findings on the issue of 
discrimination . . . [we] must remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.' 
State v. Pharris. 846 P.2d 454, 459 (Utah App. 1993)." State v. Cannon, 2002 UT App 
18,1J5, 41 P.3d 1153 (alterations original). 
II. Did the trial court err in concluding that the State presented a prima facie case 
of aggravated robbery where the evidence going to the identification of Casanova is 
ambiguous and suggests a second unidentified person, and where evidence of "force or 
fear" is scant? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision to submit a case to the jury will be 
upheld if "'upon reviewing the evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn 
from it, the court concludes that some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury 
could find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.'" 
State v. Tavlor, 884 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah App. 1994) (quotation omitted). 
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PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant Jared Casanova's ("Casanova") challenge to the State's peremptory 
strike is preserved on the record for appeal ("R.") at R.157[83]. His challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence going to the State's case in chief is preserved at R.158[276-
78]. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following constitutional and statutory provisions are determinative of the 
issues on appeal: 
United States Constitution Amendment XIV, Section 1 - Due Process of Law, 
Equal Protection: 
. . . No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1999) - Robbery: 
(1) A person commits robbery if: (a) the person unlawfully and 
intentionally takes or attempts to take personal property in the possession 
of another from his person, or immediate presence, against his will, by 
means of force or fear; or (b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses 
force or fear of immediate force against another in the course of 
committing a theft. 
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of committing a theft" if it 
occurs in an attempt to commit theft, commission of theft, or in the 
immediate flight after the attempt or commission. 
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999) - Aggravated Robbery: 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: (a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in 
Section 76-1-601; (b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or (c) 
takes an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, 
and Disposition in the Court Below. 
Appellant Jared Casanova ("Casanova") was charged by information with one 
count of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-302 (1999); one count of attempted theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1999); one count of failure to respond to an officer's signal to 
stop, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5 (Supp. 2001); 
attempted escape, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309; 
and false identity to a police officer, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-8-507(1999). R.2-5. An arrest warrant issued. R.l. 
Casanova was bound over as charged. R.156. He was tried before a jury. R.157-
58. During voir dire, Casanova challenged the removal of Alfredo Gonzalez under 
Batson v. Kentucky. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). R.157[83]. The trial court denied Casanova's 
challenge. R.157[84-85]. 
At the close of the State's case, Casanova asserted that the State did not present a 
prima facie case of aggravated robbery. R.158[276-78]. The trial court determined that 
the State presented sufficient evidence for the charge to go to the jury. R.158[281-82]. 
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At the .* >,v>~ 
going to the charge of presenting false identification to an officer. R.158[285-871 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Voir Uirc 
\ lfredo Gonza les ("Goi izales") w< i::>, i i. .u u u »ei: of til i ::; ' ei lii e in i Casano v a's ti ial 
It appears from the record that he was the only venireman of Hispanic dissent. During 
questioning, Gonzales indicated that he was into "relaxation therapy" as a hobby. 
I .11 liis I Mfiut ill llliiir I in n1 t null mi .. . . illi 
his fourth of four peremptory strikes. R.o2. (';isan<n: 
race-neutral reason for striking Gonzalez R..57[83J, The prosecutor articulated tu die 
court that he • 
didh i puin -\ Hive aes' answers in regards to a question that 
[Casanova | suggested t - . f, and that is, then leisure activities. And 
he responded . . . relaxation py. which strikes mc as odd, and struck 
me as a more liberal type of activity, and perhaps being a more liberal type 
•M* individual would give more weight i^ the defendant than he probably 
., . wv . ni; iiv. id Linn uic State pro J leivd a race-neutral reason for the strike 
I !; 157[85] 
Trial 
Christopher Jacob Kesler ("Kesler") testified to the following facts at Casanova's 
ti ial; Around 7:00 a m. on Novembu cs. _;ji;», ^csler was at his house preparing to go to 
5 
work. R.157[109], 158[23]. The sun was rising and it was light outside. R.158[23]. He 
started his black 1993 Honda Prelude, parked in his driveway, to warm it up. R.157[ 109-
10]. Kesler went back into his house through the garage to finish getting ready for work. 
R.157[109-10]. He was in the house approximately five minutes then sat on the stoop in 
the garage to put on his boots. R.157[l 11,135]. 
In the reflection of the side view mirror of his stepfather's truck, which was parked 
in the garage alongside his mother's car, Kesler saw a car drive by the house. 
R.157[l 11]. The car stopped and an individual approached the house. R.l 57[111]. 
Kesler continued to lace up his boots because he thought the person would be coming to 
the door momentarily. R.157[lll]. 
Then Kesler heard his own car door open and close. R.157[l 12]. He ran to his 
car, opened the driver's side door, and saw a man sitting in the driver's seat with his hand 
on the steering wheel. R.157[l 12,136]. Within seconds, the man let go of the steering 
wheel, reached toward his belt buckle and raised his shirt. R.157[l 13-14], R.158[26]. 
Kesler and the man never said anything to each other during the confrontation, and the 
man did not verbalize in any manner that he had a gun or weapon. R. 157[ 137]. The two 
men were within twelve inches of one another at the time. R. 157[ 152]. Kesler admitted 
that he never actually saw any weapon or gun. R.157[ 137]. 
Kesler ran back into his house scared because he thought the man had a gun and 
feared for his life or that he would be shot and hurt. R.157[ 114,138,153]. Kesler alerted 
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his parents that someone \\:w ^ r ; K - : - i- • • 
uother, Kathleen Snodgrass ("Snodgrass"), v.eiu back outside. R. 157| " i Kesler 
initially testified at trial and the preliminary hearing that he saw the cai stalled in the 
. : .- \ ;^ i cross-examination at UKJ u~ 
claimc » *- • | 
Kesler and Snodgrass got into Snodv.nss1 truck and started to follow the cai 
R ,1 57[116-17]. Snodgrass dro\"c while Kesler phoned 911 on his cell phone. 
. . ..esler kept tlK *
 s ,'tl., -.iiv-iiv.i updated as to the driver's location. 
Iliicci Phillip Hlcilsoii Mailed 
chasing the man in his patrol car. R.157[ 120-21]. 
Ellertson eventually stopped the man, later identified as Casanova, after a twenty -
four minute high-speed chase when Casanova crashed into a parked car in a residential 
, .*; . .. a . . ^ punx^; . i, > niu) set up 
in Ellertson's patrol cai. Lllerlson's patrol :::ai cai i le tc a I lalt as w ell > • I lei 11 le i ai i n: I xed 
into the black Honda. R. 157[ 178 J. Casanova jumped out of the car and fled on foot into 
> noiise R. 157[ 178]. He was apprehended and taken to the 
u'ivniii I I H I T he Ini'il In |iinip i Inn v IK I 'i | I  h | I Ilk; w JU shackled, culled behind In . 
back, and placed in the back seat of Ellertson's patrol car, further secured, by a seat belt 
TM57R79]. 
Casanova was left unattended lui a lew moments while Ellertson and other 
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officers finished investigating the crime scene. R.157[181]. Ellertson started the patrol 
car and backed it up a few feet to observe damage to his patrol car. R.157[181-82]. He 
turned the car off but left the keys in the ignition while he stepped away from the car to 
view the damage. R.157[182]. Within a few minutes, officers noticed that Casanova 
had somehow gotten into the driver's seat of the patrol car, put the car in gear, and had 
driven it into the stolen Honda again. R.157[182]. The officers rushed to secure 
Casanova. R.157[183]. Casanova was taken into custody. R.157[224-25]. A search of 
his person and the black Honda revealed no weapons. R.157[202]. 
Kesler gave a description of the man he initially encountered in his Honda that 
was different than Casanova. He described the man to the 911 dispatcher as Tongan or 
Polynesian, and claimed he had a black mustache. R.157[145]. At the preliminary 
hearing, he said the man had a shaved-bald head, mustached and goatee. R. 158[ 146-48]. 
At trial, Kesler explained that he was describing Casanova as he appeared at the 
preliminary hearing when he testified that he was bald. R. 157[ 147]. He acknowledged 
that the prosecutor at the preliminary hearing specifically asked him what Casanova 
looked like at the time of the offense, to which Kesler responded that he was bald. 
R.157[147]. 
The photograph taken of Casanova shortly after he was apprehended that same 
day shows that Casanova is Hispanic rather than Polynesian, had a full head of short hair 
and no facial hair except for light growth above his lip and on his chin. See State's 
8 
3
 57[202] I Joi letheless Keslei testified tl tat 1:1 le i i mi i ii: I tl ic pi lotogi apl I w as 
ilic same man that he initially encountered at his Honda. R. 157[ 132]. Snodgrass 
rimilarly identified Casanova as tlic man she observed driving the Honda away from their 
i. .uAii} D 8 [ 2 5 6 ] . 
SUMMARY OF THE AUCJDIMENT 
Hie trial court erred in holding that the State's peremptory strike against an 
Hispanic venireman was not racially motivated in violation of Casanova's rights under 
; c Lqual Protean^ v uuisc. i ;K Mate ^ explanation wa- not legally supported ;n the 
upport 
of its holding, 
In addition, the trial court erred in holding that the State made a prima facie case 
cf aggravated robbery where the evidence shows that someone i--ther (ha; Casano\ a was 
jed aggravated robbery. Moreover, the evidence going to tVk lorce 
c i fear" elen lent is scai it Coi lseqi iei itl> , tl lei c: is i 10 1: ^lte - able e \ - idence fron i" 
jury could conclude that Casanova was guilt\ *H*\ond a reasonable doubt. 
ARt 
_,;•• .: AJ i fS DISCRETION IN ALLOW ING 
l i l h M A J L i u u ^ b A i<A(Jl ALL Y MOTIVATED PEREMPTORY 
STRIKE AGAINST AN HISPANIC VENIREMAN W HERE THERE 
WAS NO FACTUAL SUPPORT FOR THE STRIKE NOR ADEQUATE 
FINDINGS IN SUPPORT OF THE COURT' S DECISION. 
The trial court abused its discretion in accepting the State's explanation behind a 
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peremptory strike against Alfredo Gonzales, an Hispanic venireman. See State v. 
Cannon. 2002 UT App 18, T|5, 41 P.3d 1153. The strike was racially motivated in 
violation of Casanova's equal protection rights to the extent that the State's explanation 
was not borne out in the evidence discovered during voir dire. See Batson v. Kentucky. 
476 U.S. 79 (1986); U.S. Const, amend. XIV § 1 (Equal Protection); see also State v. 
Higginbotham. 917 P.2d 545 (Utah 1997). Moreover, the trial court did not make 
adequate findings to support its decision that the strike was not racially motivated. See 
State v. Cannon. 2002 UT App 18, 41 P.3d 1153; Sta te v. Pharris. 846 P.2d 454 (Utah 
App. 1993). 
In the present case, the State struck Gonzales with its fourth of four peremptory 
strikes. R.62. Casanova objected to the strike under Batson. R.157[83]. The prosecutor 
did not contend that Casanova failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, but 
rather responded to the challenge with the explanation that he 
didn't particularly like Mr. Gonzales' answers in regards to a question that 
Ms. Remal suggested to the court, and that is, their leisure activities. And 
he responded,... relaxation therapy, which struck me as odd, and struck 
me as a more liberal type of activity, and perhaps being a more liberal type 
of individual would give more weight to the defendant than he probably 
should. 
R.157[84]. 
The trial court accepted the response, stating: 
[I] accepted as a race neutral reason Mr. Esqueda's explanation as to why 
he struck Mr. Gonzales. The case that I remember, at least, says that even 
though, if a race neutral reason is offered that's sufficient even if there 
10 
- .^.kin t iv uiie tllat Liu . , ' J : I O : aiiNonc LIMJ migiiL "tihiiK -wuki j a.>ni\ me 
striking. And Mr. Esqueda offered that kind of a reason, so I'll accent tlvt. 
^ 15~[85] The record does not contain any oral or 'written findings supporting the 
court's decision. 
i i > a i > w i *, • . . ^ v. .;".». * . ' ; i ii y 
exercise peremptory challenges "Tor am rv,^ * s > 
his view concerning the outcome of the case to be tried,. . . the Equal Protection Clause 
• JTUUS ihc prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race. " 
, .): see also Purkettv.Elem. 115 S Ct 1 ; 69 
0995; vpci av * " ' *' 1 (E< [I ii il I h < >ti : d h n: I ) ; I Jti il R C i I "' 
I fc(c)(2)-(d) (2002) (providing for exercise of peremptory strikes). The Court noted that 
"[t]he reality of practice, amply reflected in many state and 'federal court opinions, shows 
I II in, i l! H i I i . i l lci igc m a s b e , a n d u n i o r t u n a t e l y at t i m e s l ias b e e n , u s e d t o d i - ^ j .m. - ; i*e 
. . ^ n ,il 1 »1;H"k j u r o r s W ' iv<|iiiim*' l n a l i IHIIIIIM lien h r s c n s i l r v hi llliii" ii-ii I;I r , : 
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, our decision enforces the mandate of equal 
protection and furthers the ends of justice." IcL at 99. 
BatSQi _...:_. .K ,;:,.:. .. i ,/k;nDcr-. .*. *. vOgnizaDic u^iiu ^ruupi .; 
from diseritinitialiun in flu jim scloi linn pun t^s I lolland \. Illinois 4(n 11 S 4 "'•! -I"'ii 
7 7 (1990). Batson has also been adopted in Utah. See, e.g.. State v. Higginbothamu 917 
P.2d 545. 547 (Utah 1996); State v. Merrill 928 P.2d 4P1 10^-0^ (Utah App. 1996). 
•^•i baiMM , ..:..., . c-part test under 
which a court should conduct a Batson analysis." Merrill 928 P.2d at 403 (citing 
Purkett, 115 S.Ct. at 1770-71; Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 547)). 
"[0]nce the opponent of a peremptory challenge has made out a prima 
facie case of racial discrimination (step 1), the burden of production shifts 
to the proponent of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral 
explanation (step 2). If a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial 
court must then decide (step 3) whether the opponent of the strike has 
proved purposeful racial discrimination." 
Merrill, 928 P.2d at 403 (quoting Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 547 (citing Purkett, 115 
S.Ct. at 1771)). Each step is examined "in turn." Id. 
A. The Question of Whether Casanova Made a Prima Facie Case of Racial 
Discrimination Is Moot since the State Proffered an Explanation Without 
Alleging That Casanova Failed to Meet His Burden. 
In the present case, the State automatically responded to Casanova's Batson 
challenge without registering any complaint that he did not make a prima facie case of 
racial discrimination, thereby rendering the issue moot on appeal. R.157[84]. "Where 
the proponent of the peremptory challenge fails to contest the sufficiency of the prima 
facie case at trial and merely provides a rebuttal explanation for the challenge, the issue 
of whether a prima facie case was established is waived." Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 
547; see also State v. Colwell 2000 UT 8,1[18, 994 P.2d 177; State v. Bowman, 945 
P.2d 153, 155 n.2 (Utah App. 1997). This is true regardless of whether the reviewing 
court doubts the adequacy of the prima facie case made by the party challenging the 
strike. See Merrill, 928 P.2d at 403 (despite "grave doubts" about adequacy of prima 
facie case, this Court held the issue was waived where prosecutor offered explanation for 
12 
str ike • ^ > itl i :>i it cl lallei ig.ii ig pi ii i la facie case) 
In fact, Casanova made a legitimate prima facie case of racial discrimination 
which leaves nothing to doubt for purposes of the first step of the Batson analysis. 
I he elements necessary to [] a prima facie case IIK iude * • a^  complete a 
record as possible, (2) a showing that persons excluded h-Sonc io i 
cognizable group under the representative cross-section rule, and \ 3) a 
showing that there exists "a strong likelihood thai such persons are being 
challenged because of their group association rather than because of any 
specific bias." 
State v. Cantm 778 P.2d * P -1 R 1 0 aTmh 1989) (quotation omitted) (Cantu II). 
>.:i,,'\ ; s.u • tor./aies are members oi Uic Name Hispanic 
'
 i:
'~ ^^e Batson. -:" 
makes racial peremptory strike against venireman sharing defendant's race). Second, 
Gonzales was one of only two people with Hispanic surnames on the pane], the other 
(K'tsoii was I alh\ hujillo K I % ('| I*' ,'U| I rujillo w a s not c ^ v ' -n-jtu ].»< caue>c nor w a s 
1
 " , a 
juror since counsel had filled all the jury slots before she came up in line, I' ^ ; 
Gonzales' Hispanic surname alone does not make him a minority for purposes of 
Batson. See Bowman, <<; •• : ... „ ... . *. Stale v. Alvarez. 872 v. A 450. 4*7
 n.6 (I Jtah 
41! i-'i V L Bowmaii. — > 
l\2d a: ,56. "Utah courts have never found a Spanish surname alone sufficient to show 
minority status unless that minority status was corroborated by the trial court or the jurors 
tl lei i isel\ es, or \\ a •> anaispau,u .*.: onsequently; Gonzales is a member of the 
Hispanic community, a cognizable minority group recognized by the Utah Supreme 
Court, for purposes of Batson. See Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 457 n.6 ("Hispanics [are] a 
cognizable ethnic group"). 
In addition, Casanova made out a prima facie case of discrimination since it was 
based on a thorough voir dire conducted on the record that reveals "'a strong likelihood 
that such persons are being challenged because of their group association rather than 
because of any specific bias."' Cantu, 778 P.2d at 581 (quotation omitted). All the 
veniremen were asked questions to ferret out bias, such as whether they knew the 
prosecutor, defense counsel or Casanova, R.157[23-25]; whether they understood and 
could abide by the concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, R.157[26]; whether they 
could acquit or convict depending upon the quality of the evidence in light of the 
reasonable doubt standard, R.157[27]; whether they could evaluate an officer's testimony 
without giving it too much or too little weight, R.157[28-29]; whether they or any family 
members were charged with the same crimes that Casanova faced, R.157[32-33]; 
whether they or their family were victims of crime, R.157[35-44]; whether any of them 
were acquainted with police officers, R.157[ [44-48]; whether any of them had a physical 
impairment that would affect their ability to hear the evidence, R.157[50-52]; whether 
any of them had an important scheduling conflict, R.157[53]; whether any of them knew 
anyone else on the panel, R.157[65]; and whether any of them had family that practiced 
law. R.157[70]. Gonzales did not indicate that any of the above questions were an issue 
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for him or would interfere w n ._a; .cncuu. 
The venire was asked a set oi biographical questions as \\ ell, such as their 
occupations, hobbies, education levels, and their sources of news and information. I u 
tl lese qi lestioi is, Gonzales responded that lie was a real estate agent. R.15 7"[55],. He 
physical education. R.i57[63j. lie also mentioned that he was into "relaxation therapy" 
as a hobby R 157[67]. 
. ehpuc u *;L • innocuous answers uiuing \^n one. he was struck while other 
venirer example, 
Gonzales did not reply that he had any acquaintances who were police officers. 
However, Carolyn Olsen, who ultimately sat as a juror, had a son and daughter-in-law 
..
 !Avic xUiiw^ Mi iiiv ^,ni [ akc County jail. R.157[46], Moreover, while 
* •;. • AUC ;,aren 
Gorzitze, who alsu ultimately sat as a juror, knew each ( \ --n 
worked with Gorzitze's husband. R 157[65-66]. In addition, Gonzales was struck for 
having liberal tendencies on account oi in* interest in "relaxation therapy." R.. 157[67], 
( i 111 g C i 1" J i i 1 1 l ^ »! 1 ^ »" 11 < 11 " 11111 I 1111111111' 11 ' . I n 1 11 11» K I i p u l i 1111 a 11 11 (in r 11 I mi n 111 n -
camping. R.157[08j. People who like the outdoors can be quite liberal in their poli 
views, Notwithstanding this fact. Niclson was not struck and actually sat on the 
empaneleu ./•-
In light of the foregoing, Gonzales was a member of a cognizable ethnic minority 
and none of the ample record evinced any specific bias by his answers. Indeed, his 
answers were innocuous compared to those of other veniremen who were not struck and 
who actually sat on the jury. Consequently, there exists "'a strong likelihood that 
[Gonzales] was challenged because of [his] group association rather than because of any 
specific bias."' Cantu, 778 P.2d at 518 (quotation omitted). Under Batson, therefore, 
Casanova presented a prima facie case of racial discrimination. See Cantu II, 778 P.2d at 
518-19. 
B. The Explanation Proffered by the Prosecutor Is Not Supported in the 
Record and Is Therefore Legally Insufficient to Rebut Casanova's Prima 
Facie Showing of Racial Discrimination in the Jury Selection Process, 
Meriting Reversal and a New Trial in this Case. 
The prosecutor explained that he struck Gonzales because he believed "relaxation 
therapy . . . [is] a more liberal type of activity, and perhaps being a more liberal type of 
individual would give more with to the defendant than he probably should." R.157[84]. 
The trial court accepted the explanation as race-neutral and sufficient to rebut Casanova's 
prima facie claim of discrimination. R. 157[85]. The court did not make any findings to 
support its conclusion, however. 
Although "relaxation therapy" in and of itself does not necessarily mean that a 
person is liberal, to the extent that the prosecutor associated it with liberal tendencies in 
his explanation renders the explanation facially acceptable. Concern over a venireman's 
liberal tendencies has been held to be a facially acceptable explanation. See State v. 
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Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 23 (Fla.) (noting that "liberalism" presented a race-neutral 
explanation for peremptory strike), cert, denied 487 U.S. 1219 (1988); Cuestas v. State, 
933 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tex. App. 1996) ("fact that venirepersons are 'liberal' is a race-
neutral explanation for the use of a peremptory strike") (citations omitted). 
Nonetheless, "the inquiry does not end when the state articulates a facially 
acceptable reason; the trial court must also find record support for the reason to ensure 
the state has not given a pretextual explanation for an inappropriate challenge." House v. 
State, 614 So.2d 647, 648 (Fla. App. 1993) (citing Slappv. 522 So.2d at 23). "The state 
must be prepared to support its explanations with neutral reasons based on answers 
provided at voir dire or otherwise disclosed on the record itself. This requirement helps 
ensure procedural regularity and racial neutrality." Slappy, 522 So.2d at 23. 
In Utah, this means that the "trial court [must] decide whether the opponent of the 
peremptory challenge has proved purposeful racial discrimination. This determination 
generally turns on the credibility of the proponent of the strike and will not be set aside 
unless it is clearly erroneous." Higginbothairu 917 P.2d at 548 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. 
at 98 n.21; Cantu II. 778 P.2d at 518; State v. Pharris. 846 P.2d 454, 464-65 (Utah App), 
cert, denied 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993)). 
"To show clear error, the appellant must marshal all of the evidence in support of 
the trial court's findings and then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings against an attack." Id. 
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(citations omitted). u'[T]he ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation 
rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.'" Merrill, 928 P.2d at 403 
(quoting Purkett, 115 S.Ct. at 1771). 
The trial court made the following finding in support of the State's peremptory 
strike: 
I've ruled on the objections and denied all of them and accepted as a race-
neutral reason Mr. Esqueda's explanation as to why he struck Mr. 
Gonzales. The case that I remember, at least, says that even though, if a 
race-neutral reason is offered that's sufficient even if there wouldn't be one 
that the court or anyone else might thing would justify the striking. And 
Mr. Esqueda offered that kind of a reason, so I'll accept that. 
R.157[84-85]. The marshaled evidence in support of the court's finding regarding the 
strike of Gonzalez is as follows: 
- Gonzales was the only juror to offer "relaxation therapy" as his hobby. 
R.157[67]. 
- The other venireman with an Hispanic surname, Cathy Trujillo, was not struck. 
R.63. 
- The prosecutor, Carlos Esqueda, is an Hispanic himself.1 
Since the trial court's finding do not assert that any of the other "liberal" jurors 
were struck, Casanova limits his marshalled evidence to that directly pertaining to 
Gonzales. Any other discussion as to the liberal attitudes of other jurors is purely 
speculative. To the extent that their potential liberal tendencies may bear upon the strike 
of Gonzales, the following evidence is in the record: 
- The other jurors took part in more common hobbies including golf (Gorzitze, 
Jorgensen, Johnson), reading (Hansen, Jankowski, Brusch, Trujillo, Wooley), guitar 
(Kidrick), private pilot (Dart), scrapbooking (Kenison), writing (Wilkinson, Whitely), 
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In order for a peremptory strike to survive a Batson challenge, the prosecutor's 
explanation must be "'(1) neutral, (2) related to the case being tried, (3) clear and 
reasonably specific, and (4) legitimate.1" Cantu II, 778 P.2d at 518 (quotation omitted); 
see also Merrill 928 P.2d at 403-04 (citations omitted). "'[T]he presence of one or more 
of the [following] factors will tend to show that the state's reasons are not actually 
supported by the record or are an impermissible pretext: (1) alleged group bias not shown 
to be shared by the juror in question, (2) failure to examine the juror or perfunctory 
examination, assuming neither the trial court nor opposing counsel had questioned the 
juror, (3) singling the juror out for special questioning designed to evoke a certain 
response, (4) the prosecutor's reason is unrelated to the facts of the case, and (5) a 
challenge based on reasons equally applicable to juror [sic] who were not challenged."5 
internet (Wilkinson), running (Wilkinson, Blaylock), camping (Nielson, Kelson, 
Rillston), family (Perry, Jankowski, Pedersen, Olsen, Trujillo, Wooley), walking (Perry, 
Pedersen), trap shooting (Bartschi, Johnson), fishing (Sander, Rillston, Johnson), 
gardening (White), stamp collecting (Brusch), sports (Robison), crafts (Hanes), 
volunteerism (Hanes, Stuker, Wooley). R.157[67-68]. 
- The State struck Douglas Wilkinson, whose hobbies included writing, the 
internet, and running. R.157[68]. He was a civil litigator with Ray Quinney & Nebeker, 
and had several family members involved in the practice of criminal law, including 
former Attorney General David Wilkinson. R.157[70-71]. 
- The State struck Maryjane Blaylock. R.62. Blaylock could have been a liberal 
as well considering she was a retired school teacher. R.157[57]. She also had a college 
degree in education. R.157[64]. 
- The State struck Carrene Kiddrick. R.62. She had a son who was in criminal 
trouble, although she did not know which crimes he was involved in. R.157[32-33]. 
Although she had been "terrorized" when her home was burglarized, she did not feel that 
would affect her impartiality. R.157[35,40]. 
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Cantu II. 778 P.2d at 518-19 (quoting Slappv. 522 So.2d at 22). 
Even in light of the marshaled evidence, the State's explanation fails for lack of 
record support and, more importantly, because it is a racially-motivated pretext to remove 
Gonzales. See id. First, Gonzales and Casanova were both Hispanics. See Batson, 476 
U.S. at 84 (defendant's equal protection rights are violated when a juror of his or her 
same race is removed for race-based reasons) (citation omitted). 
Moreover, it means little that the other veniremember with an Hispanic surname, 
Trujillo, was not struck. Trujillo was far down on the list of veniremen and the jury was 
selected before the parties had to consider her. R.62-63. Any seasoned trial attorney like 
Carlos Esqueda would weigh that in to their calculations about who to strike, and would 
not waste a valuable peremptory strike on someone who would never come up to sit. 
Further, the record does not verify that Trujillo was actually Hispanic. She may be a 
non-Hispanic person who took on a husband's Hispanic surname. 
In addition, nothing in the record establishes that Gonzales actually shared in the 
group bias that the State assumed he harbored, nor did the State ask any follow-up 
questions of Gonzales to confirm or deny that he actually was "liberal." The State 
similarly failed to clarify through questioning what Gonzales meant by his ambiguous 
response, "relaxation therapy." R.157[67]. This is not a common term with a meaning 
accepted among the community, nor a generally accepted set of accompanying 
characteristics. It could mean a lot of things or it could simply be a tongue-and-cheek 
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response, much as one might say they are into "couch potato therapy" or "shoe shopping 
therapy" when asked what they do as a hobby. 
The State's failure to ask the critical follow up questions evinces an impermissible 
racial pretext in striking Gonzales. Under similar circumstances, other jurisdictions have 
held that failure to ask follow-up questions to verify the existence of suspected liberalism 
falls short of the protections afforded by Batson and the Equal Protection Clause. For 
example, in Slappy, the State struck two African American veniremen because they were 
elementary school teachers. See 522 So.2d at 19-20. The prosecutor believed that their 
occupations would make them more liberal and more sympathetic to the defendant, yet 
he did not question them to establish whether their bias actually existed. Id The Florida 
Supreme Court held that the state's explanation was an impermissible pretext, stating: 
the utter failure to question two of the challenged jurors on the grounds 
alleged for bias renders the state's explanation immediately suspect. 
Moreover, we cannot accept the state's contention that all elementary 
school assistants, and these two in particular, were liberal. If they indeed 
possessed this trait, the state could have established it by a few questions 
taking very little of the court's t ime. . . . By failing to ask any questions, the 
state failed to demonstrate that the alleged "liberalism" of these two jurors 
actually existed. 
Id. at 23-24 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals came to a similar conclusion in Emerson v. 
State, 851 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), where the prosecutor removed an 
African-American venireman who he believed was either a college student or a 
professor, and the prosecutor assumed that such a person would be liberal. Id at 274. 
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The prosecutor did not ask any questions to confirm that the venireman actually 
possessed those liberal characteristics. Id. The Court consequently found the state's 
explanation to be "insufficient as a matter of law to rebut appellant's prima facie showing 
of racial discrimination." Id.; see also Giles v. State. 815 So.2d 585, 588 (Ala. Crim. 
App. 2000) (reversible error to uphold strike based on inadequate explanation where 
state did not ask follow-up questions of African-American venireman who was 
"religious" to confirm assumption that she "would not be able to sit in judgment of 
another person"). 
If anything, the evidence that was before the court in this case establishes that 
Gonzales did not share in any alleged bias. When polled, Gonzales indicated by not 
raising his hand in objection that he would abide by the reasonable doubt standard and 
that he would either acquit or convict according to the quality of the evidence in light of 
that standard, R.157[26-27]; that he was not acquainted with any of the parties, witnesses 
or other veniremen involved in the case, R.157[23-25, 44-48, 65]; that he would not give 
undue weight, or inappropriately discredit, the testimony of an officer, R.157[28-29]; 
that neither he nor his family had ever been charged with the same crimes with which 
Casanova was charged, R.157[32-33]; that he did not have a physical impairment or 
important scheduling conflict that would interfere with his ability to sit as a juror, 
R.157[50-53]; that neither he nor his family were involved in the practice of law, 
R.157[70]; and that neither he nor his family had ever been victims of crime. R.157[35-
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44]. 
In addition, the same challenge based on liberal tendencies could have been made 
against two others that were not struck and who actually sat as a jurors. See Cantu II, 
778 P.2d at 519 (quoting Slappy, 522 So.2d at 22). Ginger Nielson was in to camping 
and she was divorced. R.157[56,68]. Alva Dart was a private pilot who was single as 
well. R.157[55,68]. Both of them were unmarried, which suggests they were 
unconventional in Utah Society. Moreover, many liberal people gravitate to camping 
and the outdoors; likewise, an independent thinker might take up flying as a likely hobby. 
Nonetheless, the State did not strike either of these individuals and the consequently sat 
as jurors during Casanova's trial. R.62-63. 
Of greater concern are the two individuals that the State did not strike despite 
indications of possible bias. Karen Gorzitze and Carolyn Olsen had known each other 
for 20 years since Olsen worked with Gorzitze's husband. R.157[65-66]. Moreover, 
Olsen had a son and daughter-in-law that were officers in the Salt Lake County Jail. 
R.157[46]. Gonzales, by contrast, did not have any association with any of the venire 
and did not have any associations with officers that might color his opinion. 
Nonetheless, he was struck while Gorzitze and Olsen sat. R.62-63. 
In light of the foregoing, the State's explanation does not legitimately rebut the 
prima facie case of racial discrimination made by Casanova. See Higginbotham, 917 
P.2d at 548 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21, Cantu IL 778 P.2d at 518; Pharns, 846 
23 
P.2d at 464-65). The record derived through voir dire does not legally support the State's 
explanation. See, Slappv, 522 So.2d at 23-24; Emerson, 851 S.W.2d at 274; Giles, 815 
So.2d at 588. Moreover, the State failed to ask follow-up questions to verify that 
Gonzales in fact harbored the liberal attitude that the State suspected. Id, Accordingly, 
the trial court abused its discretion in holding that the peremptory strike was non-racial, 
violating Casanova's right to equal protection and meriting reversal and remand of 
Casanova's case for a new trial. IcL; see U.S. Const, amend. XIV § 1 (Equal Protection). 
C. Alternatively, Casanova's Case Merits Remand for Findings 
Concerning the Batson Issue since the Trial Court Failed to Make Findings 
in Support of its Holding. 
Utah law provides an alternate remedy where, as here, the trial court makes 
inadequate or no findings and legal conclusions in support of its holding that a 
peremptory strike is not racially motivated. "When a 'trial court insufficiently assesses 
the facts or law relevant to the challenge' our case law directs us to remand the case to the 
trial court 'to record sufficient findings of fact and conclusions on all the evidence 
relevant to its decision, to facilitate appellate review.'" State v. Cannon, 2002 UT App 18 
at 1fl2 (quoting Pharris, 846 P.2d at 465; citing State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 597 (Utah 
1988) (Cantu I)). "'If, on remand, the trial court determines that racial discrimination 
motivated . . . the prosecutor's peremptory challenge[], it must reverse [the] defendant's 
conviction and retry his case.'" Id, (quoting Pharris, 846 P.2d at 465 (citing Batson, 476 
U.S. at 100)) (alterations original). 
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In holding that the State rebutted the prima facie case of discrimination, the trial 
court merely stated, 
I've ruled on the objections and denied all of them and accepted as a race-
neutral reason Mr. Esqueda's explanation as to why he struck Mr. 
Gonzales. The case that I remember, at least, says that even though, if a 
race-neutral reason is offered that's sufficient even if there wouldn't be one 
that the court or anyone else might thing would justify the striking. And 
Mr. Esqueda offered that kind of a reason, so I'll accept that. 
R.157[84-85]. 
In making adequate findings, trial courts are supposed to discuss on the record the 
criteria set forth in Point LB. of this brief. See Cannon, 2002 UT App 18 at ^13-14 
(noting that trial court must consider on record whether explanation is neutral, related to 
the case, clear and specific, and legitimate; remanding case for findings where trial 
court's holding was "conclusory".) The trial court in this case made no mention at all of 
those factors, however. 
Moreover, the court did not make any appropriate legal conclusions. Rather, it 
only vaguely referenced a case that it had in mind in making its decision without actually 
naming it, let alone premising a legal conclusion upon it. R.157[85]. If anything, it is 
unclear from the trial court's brief statement that it understood that it needed more than 
just a race-neutral explanation, as opposed to one that was supported in the facts so as 
not to be an impermissible pretext. See Pharris, 846 P.2d at 464 (remanding for findings 
and conclusions of law where findings "misstated applicable law"); Cannon, 2002 UT 
App 18 at [^ 13 (noting that trial court must "determine the legitimacy of the prosecutor's 
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explanation) (emphasis added). 
The trial court similarly failed to make any comment on the credibility of the 
prosecutor in defending the peremptory strike. Id. (noting that inadequacy of findings is 
"exemplified" in absence of "evaluation of credibility"). In short, the trial court did not 
carry out its duty to carefully assess on the record "'whether the opponent of the strike 
has proved purposeful racial discrimination.'" Merrill, 928 P.2d at 403 (quoting 
Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 547 (citing Purkett. 115 S.Ct. at 1771)); see also Phams, 846 
P.2d at 464 (noting that it is trial court's duty to comprehensively analyze whether 
opponent of strike has established purposeful discrimination injury selection process). 
Absent findings of fact or conclusions of law, this Court does not have the 
information necessary to assess this issue on appeal. See Cannon, 2002 UT App 18 at 
ffi[12-16; Pharns, 846 P.2d at 464-65. "Because of the necessity of evaluating the 
discrimination issue according to specific analytical guidelines, the trial court must create 
a complete record. . . . Any lack of record or trial court failure to rule on the issue of 
race-neutrality creates difficulty in assessing the adequacy of the prosecutor's explanation 
on appeal." Id. at 464. Accordingly, Casanova's case should be remanded to the trial 
court for appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law. See Cannon, 2002 UT App 
18; Pharns, 846 P.2d at 464-65. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
STATE PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH A 
PRIMA FACIE CASE OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY GIVEN THE 
AMBIGUOUS EVIDENCE GOING TO THE IDENTITY OF THE 
PERPETRATOR AND SCANT EVIDENCE OF THE " FORCE OR 
FEAR" ELEMENT. 
Casanova moved to dismiss the aggravated robbery charge on the basis that the 
State failed to make a prima facie case against him, noting that Kesler identified a man 
that looked different from Casanova as the person who initially took his car, and his 
weak, uncorroborated testimony concerning his belief that the man had a gun. 
R.158[276-79]. 
A trial court must dismiss a charge "if the State did not establish a prima facie 
case against the defendant by producing 'believable evidence of all the elements of the 
crime charged."' State v. Emmett 839 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1992) (quotation omitted). 
The charge can only go to the jury if "'the jury acting fairly and reasonably could find the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Taylor, 884 P.2d 1293, 1296 
(Utah App. 1994) (quotation omitted). A trial court's decision to submit a case to the 
jury will be upheld on appeal only if, "'upon reviewing the evidence an all inferences that 
can be reasonably drawn from it, the court concludes that some evidence exists from 
which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. (quotation omitted). 
By this standard, the trial court erred in submitting the aggravated robbery charge 
to the jury. In explaining its decision, the trial court noted that, 
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"Kesler and his mother identified the defendant as the person who was 
initially in the car at their residence and the same person who was in police 
custody at the South Jordan police station. Their identification was firm 
and appeared to be unequivocal and would be sufficient to warrant 
submitting the case to the jury . . . . 
[A]gain, it would be my conclusion that there was sufficient force or 
fear demonstrated . . . when Mr. Kesler first approached the person who 
had gotten into his car after he heard someone open his door and close it. 
He saw the person lift his shirt with one hand, reach towards his waist 
band. He assumed that they were reaching for a weapon, and that would be 
an assumption that would not be illogical or unreasonable and one, which 
the trier of fact, if they chose to believe that evidence, could conclude that 
it was indicative of someone reaching for a weapon. 
R.158[281-82]. 
For purposes of this appeal and according to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999), 
"(1) ta] person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery he : . . 
. (c) takes an operable motor vehicle." Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1999), 
"(1) [a] person commits robbery if: (a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or 
attempts to take personal property in the possession of another from his person, or 
immediate presence, against his will, by means of force or fear. . . ."2 
The marshaled evidence in support of the State's case is as follows:3 
- Kesler walked out of his house to find a man he later identified as Casanova in 
2
 The State charged Casanova under this variation of aggravated robbery. R.2. 
The trial court accordingly instructed the jury. R.75. Consequently, the other possible 
variations of aggravated robbery are not at issue in this appeal. 
3
 A party challenging the sufficiency of the evidence bears the burden of 
marshaling the evidence in a light most favorable to the State's case. See. State v. Taylor, 
884 P.2d at 1296; West Valley Citv v. Hoskins, 2002 UT App 223, Tfl3, 51 P.3d 52 
(citations omitted). 
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the driver seat of his car. R.157[l 12-13,136]. 
- Just minutes earlier, Kesler had turned on the ignition of the car and left it 
running while he went into his house to finish getting ready for work. R.157[ 109-10]. 
Kesler was sitting in his garage putting on his work boots when he saw through the 
mirror of his stepfather's truck a car stop near his house and an individual approach. 
R.157[l 11]. Kesler next heard his car door open and close, at which point he went out to 
the car to see what was happening. R.157[112]. 
- Kesler opened the car door. R.157[l 12]. Kesler and the man did not exchange 
any words, and the man did not verbally indicate a threat or that he was armed. 
However, the man let go of the steering wheel, lifted his shirt and reached toward his 
waistband. Kesler ran back into his house because he thought the man had a gun. 
R.157[l 14,138, 153]. He told his parents that a man who had a gun was stealing his car. 
R.157[115]. 
- Kesler and his mother, Snodgrass, went back outside in time to see the car stalled 
in the street in front of their house. R.157[l 15-16,155]. Kesler also testified that he saw 
the car rolling into the street and then stall. R.157[ 139-40]. 
- Kesler and Snodgrass followed the car. Snodgrass drove while Kesler called 
911 on a cell phone. R.157[l 16-17]. 
- Kesler reported to 911 that the man in his car was either Tongan or Polynesian 
and had dark, dark hair, and "light facial hair" similar to a mustache. R.157[ 123-24]. At 
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the preliminary hearing, the State asked Kesler how the man appeared when he was in his 
car. R.156[32];157[147]. Kesler replied that the man that took his car had a shaved-bald 
head, mustache and goatee. R.157[ 145-47]. Kesler explained the discrepant physical 
descriptions by saying that he was describing Casanova as he appeared at the preliminary 
hearing when he said he was bald. R.157[147]. 
- Kesler was within twelve inches of the man, but only saw him for a few seconds 
before Kesler ran back into his house. R.157[127,138,152][ Kesler was excited during 
the encounter. Both of these factors may have clouded his perception of the man in the 
car. 
- Kesler told the officers the morning that Casanova was apprehended that he was 
the same man that took his car. R. 15 7 [ 15 0 ]. 
- Kesler testified that he did not allow or give the man permission to get in his car. 
R.157[113] 
- Snodgrass said she saw the man in the side mirror of Kesler's car when they 
followed him in her car. R.158[256,264]. He had dark skin, dark eyes, facial hair, and 
dark slicked-back hair. R.158[256,267]. She was positive he had a mustache. 
R.158[267]. She could not see the man's face below his lips as she viewed him in the 
side mirror. R.158[268]. She also saw the man's face when he made a u-turn withing 
five or six feet of her car, as well as when he passed her as he drove out of a dead-end 
street. R.158[256]. She testified that the man she saw stalled in the car and making the 
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u-turn was Casanova. R.158[256-57]. She also testified that she saw Casanova at the 
police station after he was arrested later that morning when he was cuffed and escorted 
by two police officers. R.158[269,273]. She further testified that the photo of Casanova 
(State's Exhibit #7) is the man she saw stalled in the car and at the station. R.158[274]. 
- Casanova led police on a twenty-four minute car chase before he lost control of 
the car and crashed into a parked car in a residential neighborhood. See Video Tape. He 
was arrested at that point. 
This evidence, even when viewed in a light most favorable to the State's case, 
does not establish a prima facie case of aggravated robbery. See Emmett, 839 P.2d at 
784 (quotation and citations omitted); Taylor, 884 P.2d at 1296 (quotation and citations 
omitted). 
First, the evidence does not adequately establish Casanova was the man involved 
in the alleged aggravated robbery. "[I]f the evidence is sufficient only to raise a 
suspicion or conjecture as to . . . the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator, the 
motion to dismiss should be allowed." State v. Bates. 309 N.C. 528, 533, 308 S.E.2d 
258, 262 (1983). There is substantial evidence establishing that two people were in the 
car that Kesler saw pull up to his house, and that the man that Kesler first saw and who 
took the Honda was a second unidentified Polynesian individual who switched places 
with Casanova in the interim while Kesler ran back into his house to get help. 
For instance, Kesler testified that he observed a car pull up to his house and an 
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individual get out. Since he only viewed the car through the side mirror of a truck 
parked in his garage, he could not see if there were two individuals in the car, or whether 
it was Casanova or someone else that exited the car initially and got into Kesler's Honda. 
Noticeably absent from Kesler's testimony is any statement at all about the whereabouts 
of the perpetrator's car when he first went out to the Honda and confronted the man 
sitting in the driver's seat, suggesting that someone else (Casanova) drove it out of sight 
momentarily. Similarly absent is any evidence that a car registered to Casanova was 
found abandoned near Kesler's house, further suggesting that someone eventually drove 
it away while Casanova was driving Kesler's Honda. Indeed, the presence of two people 
in the car that pulled up to Kesler's house is only logical considering that a single driver 
would not likely abandon one car to steal another. 
The presence of another unidentified individual responsible for initially taking the 
car and then switching places with Casanova explains Kesler's description of a man 
different than Casanova. When speaking to the 911 dispatcher, Kesler described the man 
that he initially saw in the car as Tongan or Polynesian. R.157[ 123-24]. He also said he 
had dark hair and a mustache. IcL As evidenced by a photograph taken the same 
morning when Casanova was arrested, Casanova is Hispanic, had no mustache, and only 
slight facial hair above his lip and on his chin. See State's Exhibit #7. Although Kesler 
offered another description of a man who was bald and had a mustache and goatee, he 
explained that he was describing Casanova as he appeared at the preliminary hearing. 
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R.157[145-47]. 
In addition, the trial court erred in concluding that Snodgrass provided 
corroborating evidence identifying Casanova as the same man who initially took Kesler's 
car. R.158[284]. Snodgrass was not present during the first encounter between Kesler 
and the man. She came out of the house with Kesler after that initial encounter. She did 
not see the man that Kesler initially confronted in the Honda. She only saw Casanova, a 
different person, later when he was driving the car away. Hence, she does not provide 
any corroborating testimony about the identity of the man that initially took Kesler's car. 
Cf State v. Ortiz, 804 A.2d 937, 946 (Conn. App. 2002) (Evidence was sufficient to 
support finding that defendant was perpetrator of robbery, although victim was unable to 
identify the perpetrators because they were wearing disguises; two individuals involved 
in robbery identified defendant and testified that he carried gun); Clark v. State. 564 
S.E.2d 191, 192 (Ga. 2002) (trial court correctly denied motion for directed verdict as to 
aggravated assault charge; although victim was unable to identify assailant, other 
eyewitnesses positively identified defendant as perpetrator). 
Assuming for the sake of argument only that Casanova was involved in the 
alleged aggravated robbery rather than a second unidentified Polynesian individual, the 
evidence is nonetheless insufficient to make a prima facie case of "force or fear" for 
purposes of the aggravated robbery charge. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301; see also Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-302. Although Kesler testified that he believed the man had a gun, 
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R.157[l 14,138,153], in fact he never saw a gun, the man never indicated he had a gun, 
nor did he ever verbally threaten that he would hurt Kesler. R.157[137]. Indeed, the 
men did not say anything at all to each other during their brief encounter at the car. 
R.157[137]. Moreover, no gun was found in the Honda or on Casanova after he was 
apprehended. R.157[202]. In addition, the gestures that the man made likewise fail to 
establish the "force or fear" element. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301. Kesler testified that 
the man let go of the steering wheel, lifted his shirt and reached toward his belt buckle. 
R.157[l 13-14], However, these are only slight gestures hardly susceptible of an 
interpretation of force or fear. 
The case of State v. Suniville. 741 P.2d 961 (Utah 1987), demonstrates the 
appropriate level of threats and gestures to establish the "force or fear" element of 
robbery. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301. In Suniville, the defendant never stated that he 
had a gun, nor did the teller see a gun or anything that resembled one. Id at 962. 
However, he entered a bank wearing a ski mask. Id He approached a teller with his right 
hand in his coat pocket, and lifted it onto the counter as if it was a gun. IcL The 
defendant then said, "'[t]his is a robbery, don't turn it into a homicide. Give me all of 
your money.'" IcL The Supreme Court held that this level of threats and gestures, in the 
absence of an actual weapon, established the "force or fear" element of robbery. IcL at 
964. 
Unlike Suniville, the perpetrator in this case did not issue any verbal threats. 
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R.157[137]. Nor did he make pronounced gestures calculated to appear as if he had a 
gun or that readily lent themselves to such an inference. Id In the absence of that level 
of behavior, the man's ambiguous actions do not provide the requisite evidence necessary 
to establish a prima facie case of "force or fear." Utah Code Ann. 76-6-301. 
As a final matter, Kesler's testimony going to " force or fear" is belied by his own 
actions during the incident. Unlike a person who is actually afraid of being shot, Kesler 
came right back outside with his family after he first ran inside upon seeing the man in 
his car. Moreover, Kesler and his mother followed the man in the car for several blocks, 
often times coming within a few feet of the man as they drove. Either Kesler or his 
mother could have been shot during these events. Hence, if he was truly afraid of the 
gun, he would not have taken such great risks. The fact that he did undercuts his 
testimony going to the "force and fear" element and renders it so unbelievable that it 
does not establish a prima facie case of aggravated robbery. See Taylor, 884 P.2d at 
1296 (in order to make prima facie case, State must present believable evidence from 
which a jury could convict beyond a reasonable doubt). 
In light of the foregoing, the trial court erred in holding that the State made a 
prima facie case of aggravated robbery sufficient to go to the jury. R.158[281-82]. 
There is not sufficient "'believable evidence,'" Emmett, 839 P.2d at 784 (quotation 
omitted), to establish Casanova as the perpetrator of the alleged aggravated robbery or 
the "force and fear" element. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-301 & 76-6-302. In the absence 
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of "'some evidence [] from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of 
[aggravated robbery could be] proven beyond a reasonable doubt,'" the trial court was 
bound to grant Casanova's motion for directed verdict and abused its discretion in failing 
to do so. Taylor, 884 P.2d at 1296 (quotation omitted). 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, Casanova respectfully requests this Court to reverse his 
convictions since the trial court erred in upholding the State's racially motivated 
peremptory strike. Moreover, the aggravated robbery conviction fails for insufficient 
evidence. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this Ht day of November, 2002. 
CATHERINE E. LILLY 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 011919600 FS 
Judge: ROBIN W. REESE 
Date: June 17, 2 0 02 
PRESENT 
Clerk: marlened 
Reporter: SCHULTZ, KATHLEEN 
Prosecutor: ESQUEDA, CARLOS A 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): REMAL, LISA J. 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: September 3, 1979 
Video 
CHARGES 
1. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 05/02/2002 Guilty 
2. THEFT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 05/02/2002 Guilty 
3. FAIL TO STOP/RESPOND AT COMMAND OF POLIC - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 05/02/2002 Guilty 
4. ATTEMPTED ESCAPE FROM OFFICIAL CUSTODY - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 05/02/2002 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 3rd Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to 
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
Page 1 
Case No: 011919600 
Date: Jun 17, 2002 
Based on the defendant's conviction of FAIL TO STOP/RESPOND AT 
COMMAND OF POLIC a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to 
an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
C/O COUNT I AND COUNT III TO RUN CONSECUTIVE WITH EACH OTHER / 
COUNT II TO RUN CONCURRENT / COUNT IV NO SENTENCE IMPOSED / TO PAY 
FULL RESTITUTION THROUGH BOARD OF PARDONS / C/O THIS CASE TO RUN 
CONSECUTIVE WITH OTHER CASES ON PAROLE 
Dated this j day of , 20^ """ .^ --- ^ 
//U^- IJM^ 
ROBIN W. REESE /--/^«T^*X 
District Court Judge', x, ^ *,y \ 
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